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MAC ROFCONOM ft's
I)ISCRETION IN TI-IF CHOICE OF MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
BY KENNEThGAIkIIAI )F *
This paper explores the quantitative implications for uggreg(zr(' economic performance andstabilityof
cinulueting adiscretionarypohet' developed from thetheoryof feedback control of stochwtc 5)5 ferns.
The control .ccherne applied here partitions thepolkyproblem into a deterministic planning problem and
a stochasin' stabilization problem. The results indicate that .sigiithcant gains are arailahh' from a dis-
cretionart' policy acer a non-discretionary policy of fixed instrwnent choices.
Whether macroeconomic policy for the United States should admit an clement
of discretion has been an issue among economists for over a decade, and isrecog-
nized as one of the principal elements of the monetarist-fiscalist debate. The
question has typically been addressed by characterizing the dynamic aspects of
the American economy and then asking whether the performanceofan econdmy
with such characteristics could be improved by allowing discretionary changes
in policy choices from time to time. For example, in his recent review article
Leonall Andersen (1973) notes the fisc'.alist view that exogenous disturbances of
the economy "lead necessarily to recurring fluctuations in output and prices
which are of a cyclical nature," and the fiscalist belief that "there does not exist
a self-correction mechanism" for those fluctuations. As a consequenceofthese
views and beliefs, Andersen observes, fiscalists "have advocated very active
stabilization actions in the short run. Even if a disturbance is absorbed, the time
interval is considered to be so long that economic welfare will be greatly reduced
if short-run stabilization actions are not taken." On the other hand. Andersen
continues, "monetarists contend that our economic system is such that disturbing
forces... arerather rapidly absorbed and that output will naturally revert to its
long-run growth path following a disturbance," and they believe "that theeconomy
is inherently stable, thereby requiring no off-setting actions."
This paper presents quantitative results on the merit of a discretionary policy
relative to one that sticks to pre-selected instrument choices regardlessofthe
evolution of the economy. Rather than follow the historic line of debate and
examine the dynamic characteristics of a model of the economy we choose instead
to examine the consequences of applying a specific discretionary policy. The set
of policy tools and the type of discretion we consider are both limited. Onlya few
well-known and easily quantified instruments, including government expenditures
and a tax surcharge variable, are treated. We do not address the problem of
choosing policies of a microeconomic nature, e.g., anti-trust policyor wage and
price controls. The discretion we permit is limited to a functional relationship
* The auihor would like to thank Gregory ('how and Ras lair formany helpful suggestions during
deselopnient of the economic model used in this paper, and Andrew Abel and William Silber for
expositional suggestions. He would also like to thank Hank Berkicy, Bernard Chester arid Duval
Thompson for assistance in computer programming and Silvia Yanky for preparation of the typescript
215between the magnitude of policy instruments in the current period and the state
of the economy in past periods. Once these relationships have been defined the
element of choice disappears.
The first section of the paper relates the method of analysis. placing it in
the context of previous work by economists and control engineers on the feedback
control of dynamic systems. Here we develop the relationship between instrument
choices and past states of the economy characterizing our discretionary policy.
The second section briefly describes an econometric model of the post-World
War Two United States economy and the criterion function which we use to
measure macroeconomic performance. The third section presents the optimal
instrument values for the model with respect to the criterion function when
uncertainty is ignored. The last section presents results from simulation of the
model in the presence of uncertainty when policy choices are first kept constant
and then permitted to vary in response to past states of the economy. The results
focus on the contribution of a discretionary policy to stabilization of economic
activity and to the improvement of average economic performanceas measured
by the criterion function.
I. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Consider an economy described by the reduced-form dynamic model:
(Ia) = j(x,u, t = 1,2,.
(Ib)
(Ic) p()
where x1 is the n-dimensional vector representing thestate of economic activity
in time t, ziis the ni-dimensional vector of choices for the policy instrumentsand
is a vector of random exogenous disturbances withdensity function p(). We
assume C andare statistically independent for ts. The econometric model
presented in Section 2 can be considered to be in the form ofequation (1). Unless
the dynamic structure of the system is trivial,e.g.,x = f1(u1, c,), realizations of C
affect the state of the economy in periods after timet as well as in time t. Whether
such exogenous effects are persistentor dissipate rapidly can only be discovered
by inspection of the actual model,so the general form of (I) does not pre-judge
either the monetuist or flscalist positionson the matter of persistence of exo-
genous shocks.
In order to select values for the policyinstruments we require a criterion that
indicates whether a particular policystrategy is better or worse than another
strategy. Our criterion is a serially additive lossfunction on a state trajectory of
finite duration:
(2) L(X) =f(x)X = (x0,
.
where fis a scalar-valued function of thestate of the economy in periodt. We
exhibit the actual loss function used in thispaper in Section 2.
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aThe optimal policy strategy is obtained by solving the problem of choosing
feedback functions:
(3) = g,(x1)t -
to minimize the expectation of loss subject to the constraint of the model. This
problem can, in principle, be solved by application of the principle ofdynamic
programming(Bellman, 1957). Jfno restrictions are placedon the class ofadmissible
feedback functions the optimal functions will generallynot be constant with
respect to state. Thus optimal discretion in the choice of policies will improve the
performance of the economy as measured by the expectation of loss, andrestriction
of the policy strategy to state-invariant policies will result inat least as large an
expected loss. However, in the extreme case of a trivial dynamic model,x, = 1(u,, ç,),
where persistence is absent, the optimal feedback functionsare in fact constant
with respect to x
As is well-known (Astrom 1970, Chow 1972a, for example),the special
case of a linear model and quadratic loss function leads to analytic expressions
for the feedback functions. Quantitative aspects of that problemin a macro-
economic context have been investigated by Chow (1972b). Asa practical matter
for most other models or loss functions the feedback functions ofequation (3)
may be impossible to obtain analytically. Since the model we use here is non-linear,
and the loss function is non-quadratic, an approach other than direct application
of dynamic programming i3 required.
The mean disturbance method, well known to control engineersand sum-
merized by Athans (1972), is one possible alternative. The method beginsby







derived from the original problem by replacing the randomvector,with its
expected value. This replacement is admittedly ad hoc, and the resultingdeter-
ministic model may not exhibit any particularly desirable properties.For example,
as Howrey and Kelejian(1971)have noted, unless the model is linear itmay not
follow that:
(5) E(jç(x,-u,)!x,-, a,) = f,(x,, U,, Eg,))
but we hope the true property is not too different from (5). Inreplacing the
disturbance with its expected value some comfort is derived fromthe observation
that most simulations of macro-econometric modelsare presented for model
(4b), derived from (la) in the manner prescribed. [Nagar (1969) isan exception.]
Computation of the solution to problem (4), while perhaps difficult, isnot im-
possible, since it requires minimization over a finite number ofparameters (Canon,
Cullum and Polak1970,Polak1971and Himnielblan1972).
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Let U he the solution to problem (4). whichwe will call the "nominal" polkv
sequence, and let X be the nominal state trajectory associated with U bymodel
(4b, c). In Section 3 we present the values of Uand Xfor the model and loss fiIncton
described in Section 2. Ifwe invariantly apply policy u, in period I the economy




For the purposesofthis paper we identify equation (6) withan economy operating
under a non-discretionary policy,recognizing, however, that there arc other
methodsofcomputing fixed policy strategies whichyield sequences different
from U. e.g.. open-loop optimalcontrolofstochastic systems. In Section 4 we
present the estimated expected loss (asan objective measure of performance) and
the standard deviationsofselected componentsofstate (as a subjective measure
of stability) derived from MonteCarlo simulationofmodel (6)
Since state dependson the realization of the random vectors,as veIl as on
the choice of policies.we do not anticipate that state trajectory Xwill occur in
any given simulation, but rather anticipatethat the proximityofthe economy
to the contemporaneous nominalstate will become increasingly uncertain through
time. Since X was the optimalstate trajectory subject to the constraint ofthe
deterministic model, a reasonable,albeit heuristic, discretionarystrategy might be to stabilize the state ofeconomic activity around the trajectory X. Asdescribed by Athans (1972) the secondstageofthe mean disturbance approachemploys
a first-order expansion of the originalstate model about the pointL,ü,, E(,)]
to model the propagation of deviationsin state from the nominaltrajectory:
(7) Ax, = A, Ax,_1 + 13, Au,+ e,
where Ax, = x,- .,. Au,u, - ii,, A, is the Jacobian ofwith respect to the state vector, B, is the Jacobian ofjwith respect to the policyvector, both evaluated at [.,-., ü,, E(,)], and e, is an n-dimensional random vectorrepresenting both the high-order terms in theexpansion and the first-ordercontribution of the original




(Sb) Ax, = A, Ax,_+ B, Au, ± e,
(Sc) Ax0 = 0
where K, is a positive-scmi-definite matrix. For thispaper we define K, as the Hessian of f evaluatedat.,. Problem (8) is well-known withexact solution given by:
(9) Au, = G, Ax. = I T
with feedback matrix:
(Wa) G, = (B;H,B,)-'n;H,A
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eand Ricatti equation:
(lOb) = K,+ (1, + B,G,)fl,(!1, + B,G,) t 7
= K1.
The feedback function of(9) tells us how to alter policy in period t away from
the nominal policy in response to a reali?atiuli of state awa from the nominal
state. Noting that Au, = a, - ü,, discretion is represented by the feedback function:
(II) a, = ü, -- G,(x,_-
This function is in the general form of equation (3) bitt is hot necessarily optimal
since it may not satisfy the necessary conditions derived from dynamic programm-
ing. When the feedback function of( II) is incorporated into the original stochastic
model the system becomes:
(I 2a) X,=J[,_.ii, + G,(x,_1 - I = T
(I 2b) = xo.
We identify equation (12) as representing the economy operating under a dis-
cretionary policy. In Section 4 we present the results of Monte Carlo simulation
of(12), again exhibiting the estimated value of expected loss and the growth in
uncertainty about future states of economic activity.
It is informative to economists to look upon the mean disturbance approach
to the problem of feedback control of a stochastic economy as offering a solution
in two parts. The first part is the nominal policy sequence, and provides a long-
range policy plan to administrators. The second part, consisting of the feedback
matrices G,, provides a response rule for altering planned policy in the face of
random and unanticipated changes in the state of economic activity. Future
conditions may force change in planned policy, but if the stochastic components
of the economy are not large relative to the predictable components, one expects
that actual choices will be in a neighborhood of the planned choices. Moreover,
if the effects of the random disturbances on the state of the economy do exhibit
persistence. a scheme which takes timely action to offset the disturbances may
contribute significantly to stabilizing economic activity. In so doing the scheme
may forestall development of a situation where a major shift in policy is neces-
sitated in order to cut off an extended boom or to pull the economy out of a reces-
sion. It remains to be established, however, whether the mean disturbance approach
will actually dominate the non-discretionary policy. Since the feedback function
of equation (II) is likely sub-optimal it is not obvious that the non-discretionary
policy will actually result in poorer economic performance compared to the
performance of the discretionary policy.
2. AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL ANt) Loss FUNCTION
The model used in this study is organized about a market for aggregate
product, a labor sector and a financial sector. It is a quarterly model estimated on
data from 1947/I-1969/IV and based on the National Income and Product
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Accounts (NIA). The model provides the linkage between choices for a set of
familiar policy instruments and the behavior of some pnncipal measures of
aggregate activity like unemployment and inflation. Detailed equations of the
model arc listed in the appendix. Wc present here a brief dcscription of those
equations.
The market for gross private product is patterned on an income-expenditure
structure. summing up the components of demand in the NIA product account
and then working down the income side to arrive at disposable income. Demand
for privately produced goods and services conies from four sectors. Households
spend their disposable income on consumer services (Al), non-durable goods(A2)
and durable goods (A3). Businesses invest in plant and equipmentto maintain a
constant capital/output ratio (A4), and in inventories as a function ofcurrent
and lagged sales and the lagged stock of inventories (A5). Investment inresidential
structures follows from contemporaneous and lagged housingstarts and the
Jagged stock of residential structures (A6). Imports adjustto a long-run level
specified as a linear function of the rate of production (A7)while exports follow
a simple autoregressive structure about a time trend (A8). Governmentpurchases
of privately produced goods and servicesare a policy instrument of the model.
Gross private product is thesum of demand from the four sectors (A9), andgross
national product is obtained by inflating privateproduct and adding compensation
of government employees (A 10). The latter isan instrument of policy in the model.
On the income side gross corporate earningsare a function of current and
past private production (Al I). Dividends followa lagged adjustment process on
earnings (Al2). Federal and state and localindirect business taxesare a function
of current consumption expenditures(A13 and .414). The function forFederal
taxes uses a dummy variable to split thesample period as a result of the Excise
Tax Reduction Act of 1965, while thefunction for state and local itemsuses a
linear time trend on the coefficientto model secularly changing schedules.Federal personal taxes are a function ofpersonal income plus contributionsfor social insurance less government transferpayments less state and local personaltaxes
(A 15). The sample period is split bya dummy variable to account for the reduction
in tax rates in 1964. A scaling factorfor the federal liability schedule.S. is a policy instrument of the model. This factorwas unity over the sample periodexcept during 1968/Ill-I 969/IV when itwas 1.1. corresponding to the 10percent surcharge of that period. State and localpersonal taxes are a function ofpersonal income plus contributions for socialinsurance lessgovernment transfer payments (A 16). Contributions for social insuranceare a function of the collectionrates for the OASDHI program and forthe federal unemploymentinsurance program and of personal income pluscontributions less transferpayments (A 17). Transfer pay- ments are a function of thepopulation over age 65.a benefit schedule factor for old age and survivorsInsurance, and the number ofworkers unemployed (A 18). A dummy variable is usedto account for the substantialincrease in transfers which occurred when theMedicare programwas introduced in 1965. Miscel- laneous items inthe income accountare summarized byan autoregressive process about a time varyingaverage (A 19). Disposable incomeis the dilTerence between gross nationalproduct and intermediateitems in the incomeaccount (A20).
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(A21) as a function of the rate of production to private non-farm employment
(A22l as a function of manhours paid for. Farm employment is assumed to follow
a simple trend model (A23) and government employment is a policy instrument of
the model. Summing private non-farm, farm and government employment yields
total employment on a jobs filled basis (A24). The labor force employed follows
from total employment on an assumption that multiple job holding is sensitive to
the opportunity for employment as measured by the unemployment rate (A25).
The total labor force (A29) is the sum of the participation of three groups. males
age 25 to 54 (A26), other males (A27) and females (A28). The unemployed labor
force is the difference between the total labor force and the employed labor force
(A30).
The financial sector consists of equations for the corporate bond rate, change
in deposits at financial intermediaries and demand for transactions balances
(currency and demand deposits). The bond rate is assumed to adjust to an equi-
librium level given by the Treasury bill rate and a proxy for the expected rate of
inflation (A3l). Demand for demand deposits follows an interest-elastic pro-
portional transactions demand model with the bill rate and disposable income as
the arguments (A32). Demand for currency follows the same type of model using
the bond rate as the interest argument (A33). l'he change in savings deposits at
commercial banks, savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks is a
fraction of disposable income not expended on consumer goods and services.
with the fraction varying with the spread between the bond and bill rates (A34).
The change in deposits at savings and loan associations and mutual savings
banks is a simple fraction of the change in savings deposits which varies linearly
with time (A35). The model will accept either the bill rate or the money supply
(defined as currency plus demand deposits) as an instrument of policy. In this
study we use the bill rate as the policy variable, leaving the money supply as an
endogenous state variable.
Explanation of housing starts, the proxy for the expected rate of inflation
and the level of the price deflator for gross private product completes the behavioral
equations of the model. Housing starts are assumed to follow from the flow of
funds to the two major suppliers of residential mortgages, savings and loan
associations and mutual savings banks, and from the change in Federal Home
Loan advances to savings and loan associations (A36). The latter is an instrument
of policy in the model. The proxy for the expected rate of inflation is a convex
combination of its lagged value and the lagged value of the actual rate of inflation
(A37). The current rate of inflation is a function of the proxy for the expected rate
and the difference between the actual rate of production and a standard rate of
production based on an unemployment rate of four percent (A38). The price
deflator follows immediately from the rate of inflation (A39). Four indentities
yield the end of quarter stocks of consumer durables (A40), producers plant and
equipment (A41), residential structures (A42) and business inventories (A43) as
the sum of current gross additions and the undepreciated portion of the previous
period stocks.
There are three central elements of the model for policy purposes. The first
is the demand for labor services as a function of gross private prcduction coupled
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with the appearance of inflationary pressure when production rises above the
standard rate. These two phenomena define the short-run Phillips relation
between unemployment and inflation. Increases in either government purchases
of privately produced goods and services or government compensation of its
employees adds to demand, the former directly and the latter through the con-
sumption functions. The consequent stimulus to the rate of production both adds
to the inflationary pressure on the economy and reduces unemployment. The
Phillips curve of the model is horizontal with respect to contemporaneous changes
in policy. Over progressively longer runs it grows steadily steeper due to the
presence of the proxy for the expected rate of inflation in the equation for the
actual rateofinflation.
The second central element of the model is the elasticity of aggregate demand
and production with respect to change in the Treasury bill rate. This elasticity is
derived by tracing through the effect of the spread between short and long term
interest rates on change in savings deposits to change in thrift deposits to housing
starts and finally to investment in residential structures. The third central element
is the direct effect on the unemployment rate of a change in government employ-
ment.
In constructing a loss function on economic performance we were concerned
with specifying two objectives. Our major interest with respect to the variablesof
state was stabilizationofthe rateofunemployment at four percent and stabilization
ofthe price level.Ofsubsidiary interest was increasing consumption and stocks
of residential structures. The second major objectivewas stabilizationofthe change
in the policy instruments from quarter to quarter in orderto guard against
unreasonably large fluctuations in those instruments. We choseas the single-
period loss function the form:
(13) j,° = (0.9925)(i6.66(Rp)2 + 33.33 (Ru - 4.0)2
- 20.0[(Es + En + 0.2478 Kd)/P:J -- l0.0(Kh/Pi)
+ [(G - 1.01157 G_ )/2.22J2 + [(Eg- 1.00930 Eg)/0.l00]2
+ [(Rib - Rth. i)/0.372]2+[(S - 1.0)/0.025]2
+ [(FHL - PFIL)!0.882]2 + lOO.O1(Yg- P iEg)/0.770j2).
The first term indicatesour preference for a four percent rate of unemployment
(Ru) and zero inflation (Rp). The second andthird items account for our preference
for greater per capita consumptionand residential housing. Thenext five items
serve to stabilize government purchases of privatelyproduced goods and services
(G), government employment (Eg). theTreasury bill rate (Rib), the federal personal
tscaIing factor (S) and FederalHome Loan advances (FilL), respectively.
FHL is a target level of deflatedadvances constructed from the predictionsof a simple time trendon actual deflated advances. The last itemties government
compensation of its employees (Yg)to the number of employees througha per
capita real wage index (Wg). Theindex was constructed from the predictionsof a time trend on the actual realwage of employees.
To specify the numericalparametersofthe loss function we inspected the post-war behaviorof the policy instruments.Estimation, e.g.. of the simple
222quarterly model G = fIG+reveals that government purchases havegrown on
average at a rate of 1.157 percent per quarter witha standard errorof2.22 billion
dollars at 1958 prices. Arguing that such tong-termbehavior stems from causes
other than management of aggregate activity, Irexample, meeting demands for
public goods, it seems reasonable to penalize short-runpolicy choices when they
deviate from trend behavior. The term 1(G- 1.01157 G)/2.22j represents a
normalized measureofthe deviationofcurrent government purchases from the
target level of 1.01157 G. The construction of the quadratic stabilization terms
for government employment, the Treasury billrate, Federal Home Loan advances
and government compensation is similarly motivated.The absolute weights on
unemployment and inflation are arbitrary but the relativeweights were chosen
to penalize an increase in the unemploymentrate above four percent twice as
heavily as an equal increase in inflation abovezero. In the absence of any theory
on the construction of loss functions defined over alternativestates of aggregate
activity, particularly in those cases where primaryconcern is directed towards
unemployment and inflation, any parameter choicesaie somewhat arbitrary.
Our approach in developing normalized penalty functionsfor instrument stabiliza-
tion was to narrow, however incompletely, the limitsof choice. Only after several
quantitative studies have been reported,e.g., Pindyck (1973) and Chow (1972b),
will we begin to see whether optimal policiesare robust with respect to specification
of the loss function.
We chose a planning interval of elevenquarters. Earlier work with the model
(Garbade 1975) has shown that optimal policychoices exhibit a noticeable
influence from the proximity of the planning horizonin the last four quarters,
so T = 11 gives us seven quarters of meaningful policies. Morearbitrarily we
choose 1960/I as the initial quarter, and set the initialstate vector i to its historic
value in that quarter.
3. THENo1iNAE.Pouc SEQUENCEANDSTATE TRAJECTORY
Table I presents the quarterly sequences of each ofour six policy instruments
which are optimal for problem (4). For comparisonwe also exhibit in Table I
the historic choice of policies over thesame interval. Note that while optimal
government purchases (G) fluctuate over the planning interval,government
employment (Eg) and hence government compensation(Yg) grow monotonically.
albeit at a slightly declining rate through time.With respect to the criteria of
unemployment and inflation with whichwe are primarily concerned, better
performance is evidently obtained by government spendingon direct employment
rather than seeking an indirect stimulus to employmentby purchases of privately
produced goods and services. The Treasury billrate is steady, and Federal Home
Loan advances grow evenly until the lastyear of the planning interval. It is
interesting to note that the federal personaltax scaling factor hardly varies from
its no loss value of unity. The choice of fiscal policy whichis optimal for the model
and loss function is quite stimulative, andoccurs entirely as an increase in ex-
penditures rather than as a decrease in tax rates.
Table 2 shows the nominal and historic development ofgross private produc-































































































































































































































9.81 10.18 10.18 0.0 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.0
IV





11.39 11.35 0.227 1.000 0.998 0.997 0.006
III 10.07
11.79 11.74 0.275 1.000 0.999 0.998 0007
IV 10.31





12.90 12.83 0.505 1.000 1.003 1.005 0006
III 10.64
13.21 13.11 0.470 1.000 1.003 1003 0.007
IV 10.68
13.48 13.40 0.458 1.000 1.000 0.999 0005 13.73 13.63 0.478 1.000 0.996 0.996 0004TABLE 2
DYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE
unemployment rate of 4 percent) is striking. The rise in production and dip in
unemployment in the last quarter (1962/IV) clearly reflects the influence of the
proximity of the planning horizon on the nominal policy choices. Table 2 also
presents the nominal and historic trajectories for expenditure on consumer
durables (Ed), investment in plant and equipment (Ip) and investment in residential
structures (Ih). With the exception of the former there appears to be little difference
in the nominal and historic patterns. The minimum value of loss attained by the











Gross Private Product (billionsofdollars at 1958 prices)
447.0
II 445.8 450.1 449.2 4492 3.85 3.85
III 443.5 451.5 449.5 449.5 7.20 5.96
IV 439.5 451.0 448.3 447.9 8.50 626
1961/I 438.4 453.9 451.2 450.9 9.52 6)3
II 448.4 4564 453.8 453.5 11.84 6.41
III 456.6 457.0 454.2 454.0 14.10 7.42
IV 466.0 457.9 456.5 455.8 14.56 8.05
1962/I 473.0 461.3 461.5 459.2 13.79 9.37
II 480.8 464.5 466.9 462.9 12.80 8.68
III 486.3 470.3 476.7 471.4 14.09 8.53
491.3 482.6 492.9 486.2 18.52 9.06
RateofInflation (percent)
1960/I 1.80
II 1.70 1.86 2.06 2.06 1.11 1.11
III 0.67 1.88 2.10 2.10 1.03 1.03
IV 1.96 1.87 1.71 1.69 1.38 1.35
1961/I 0.93 1.80 1.74 1.71 1.11 1.04
11 0.12 1.86 1.68 1.65 1.21 1.17
111 -0.08 1.92 2.34 2.31 1.25 1.17
lv 1.97 1.90 '.88 1.86 1.55 1.32
1962/I 1.32 1.89 1.96 1.91 1.41 1.40
II 0.52 I.91 2.20 2.07 1.48 1.43
111 0.83 2.1)4 2.29 2.08 1.52 1.38
IV 1.14 2.17 2.56 2.28 1.74 1.40
Labor Force Unemployed (millionsofworkers)
1960/I 3.557
11 3.652 3.492 3.419 3.419 0.338 0338
III 3.889 3.382 3.274 3.291 0.436 0.383
IV 4.400 3.416 3.284 3.322 0.558 0423
1961 /1 4.785 3.432 3.298 3.339 0.641 0.419
II 4.927 3.429 3.390 3.430 0843 0.482
III 4.762 3446 3.362 3.388 0.874 0.515
IV 4.348 3.481 3.329 3.372 0.862 0.479
1962/I 3.958 3.478 3.336 3.447 0.748 0.297
II 3.811 3.460 3.323 3.513 0.680 0.335
III 3.931 3.435 3.178 3.427 0.763 0.363
IV 3.911 3.262 2.932 3.255 0.883 0.490I
TABLE 2
l)vNAIIc CIIARACFERIS II(S OFSIA ii:(oriinucd)
4. SIMULATION 01:Pouc-vSTRATEGIES FOR A STOCHASTICEcoNo\lv
In this section we introduceuncen.tinty into our description of the economy
and study the impacton economic stability and performance of discretionary
change in the nominal policysequence. In all cases 30 stochastic simulations of
the model provides the sampleset for statisticaI estimation.
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Expenditures on Consumer l)urahlcs (billionsofdollars at 1958 prIces)
45.4
II 45.6 46.6 46.1 46.1 .89
Ill 45.0 47.4 46.8 46.8 2 55 2.35
IV 43.5 47.9 47.3 47.2 275 2.63
1961/I 41.7 48.8 48.1 48.0 3.02 2,86
II 43.2 49.6 48.7 48.6 3 2.95
III 44.5 50.! 49-4 49.3 3.36 2.58
IV 46.3 50.6 50.1 50.0 4.29 3.40
1962 I 48.1 51.0 SI.)) 50.7 4.02 3.51
11 48.1 51.8 52.2 51.6 4.00 3.39
III 497 52.9 54.1 53.3 4.90 4.14
Iv 50.8 54.9 56.9 55.9 5.10 3,99
Investment in Plant and Equipment(billions ofdoliacat 195$ prices)
19601 46.6
Il 47.6 48.0 47.9 47.9 1.00 1.00
III 47.0 48.3 48.4 48.4 1.75 .57
IV 47.0 47.8 47.9 47.8 2.13
19611 449 47.5 47.7 47.6 2.6) 1.85
II 44.6 47.3 47.3 47.2 3.69 2.54
III 45.7 47.0 46.6 46.5 4.59 2.87
IV 46.6 46.6 46.6 46.4 4.69 2.64
19621 47.6 4&6 47.0 46.6 4.36 226
49.3 46.8 47.7 46.9 3.91 2.14
III 51.1 47.5 49.5 48.3 4.17 2 SS
IV 50.7 49.4 52.2 50.5 5.17 3.16
Investment in Residentiil Structures Ibillions of dollars at 1958 prices)
19601 23.7
II 22.0 22.5 22.6 22.6 0.79 0.79
III 21.0 22.2 22.1 22.1 1.15 1.15
IV 20.7 20.9 20.8 20.7 1.59 1.79
19611 20.9 22.5 22.3 22.4 1.66 2.07
II 21.1 23.1 22.9 23.0 1.45 1.71
III 21.6 27.0 22.1 22.2 1.46 1.67
IV 22.6 21.4 21.4 21.4 (.34 1.52
1962 1 23.1 22.8 22.6 22.4 1.32 1.60
II 23.8 22.1 22.1 21.9 1.66 2.01
III 24.2 21.2 21.4 21.4 1.46 1.50
IV 23.8 22.8 23.4 23.1 1.56 .53F
The expected value of the loss function is perhaps the mostcomprehensive
single measure of economic performance. From the Monte Carlosimulations we
obtained:
Non-thscret iOnarv Polkv (the fllo(lel ol equation (6))
Estimated Expected Loss 10,532.
Estimated Standard Deviation of Loss16,637.
Discretionary Policy (the model of equation (12))
Estimated Expected Loss 5,298.
Estimated Standard Deviation of Loss 4,698.
These results may be compared with the value of loss forthe model simulated in
the deterministic mode of equation (4b, c) of 449.12. The consequencefor loss ol
a stochastic economy is clearlysubstantial. Equally obvious is the important
contribution of the discretionary policy in mitigating the effectsof random shocks.
with expected !oss reduced by 50 percent when discretion ispermitted. This
estimate of a 100 percent increase in loss when policy makersfollow a fixed
sequence of policy choices accords with theresults of Chow (1972h) and adds to
the accumulating evidence of the sacrifice in economicperformance implicit in
the recommendation of a non-discretionary policy when avalid representation
of the economy is available.
Looking at the contribution of discretion to stabilizationof economic
activity, Table 2 presents the estimated mean trajectoriesand the estimated
standard deviation about those trajectories of selected componentsof state for
both non-discretionary and discretionary policy strategies. In the meandisturbance
approach applied policy is altered away from the nominal policyonly when the
realized state in the previous period differs from thenominal state. Since there is
no difference in the realized andnominal states in the initial period, the choice of
policy in 1960/LI is identical in both regimes (cnf. equation (8c)and the resulting
implication from equation (11) that u1 = i) and the means andstandard devia-
tions of state are similarly identical. After 1960/LI the policy choicesgenerated by
a discretionary strategy can vary awayfrom the nominal choice and we observe
a difference in the developmentof the means and standard deviations. One
obvious difference is the greater stability of economic activity,i.e., smaller standard
deviations, when discretion in the policy process is permitted.Uncertainty in
projected levels of private production and the unemployed laborforce is reduced
about 50 percent by discretionary change in planned policies.The effectiveness of
discretion in stabilizing the rate of inflation is not as great. hut it isstill positive.
Uncertainty in household expenditures on durable goods andin business
investment in plant and equipment is also reduced by adiscretionary strategy.
Expenditures on consumer durables depend in part on the changein disposable
income (equation A3), which is stabilized by the contemporaneouseffect of auto-
matic stabilizers (unemployment insurance, positivemarginal tax rates, etc.) in
the structure of the economy. Investment in plantand equipment, on the other
hand, depends on the change in production (equation A4), soit is not surprising
that the stabilizing effect of a discretionary policy isrelatively greater for plant
and equipment. For two decades economists havecommented on the important
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contribution tax and transfer programs have made to economic stability(lewis
1962 for example) because of their stabilizing effect on disposable income
Residential construction alone among the sectors of theeconomy displas
less stability when discretion is permitted. Table 2 indicates that thedegradajo0
is not substantial, the standard deviation increasing about 20percent with dis-
cretion, but this result does demonstrate the peculiar position of housingin hearing
a disproportionate share of the bundens of short-runmacroeconomic policy
actions. The existence of this problem has received attentionin thc literature
(Federal Reserve Staff Study: Was's to Moderate Fluctuatio,isin Housing Co,,-
strucrion, 1972). It would be informative to explore thecosts in terms of inflation
and unemployment of requiring greater stability in homebuilding badding
terms to the Kr matrices of equation (8a) penalizing variationin investmentin
residential structures away from the nominal level ofinvestment. Policyactions
directed towards stabilizing home building activityhave been undertakenfrom time to time by the Federal Home Bank System,and there is some questionwhether such actions have been consistent with the largergoals of macroeconomicpolicy.
Under the discretionary policy the chosen valuesof the instruments,depending as they do on realized states of economic activity,are random variables after
1960/Il. (They equal the nominal valuesin that first quarter.) Wemay, consequently, inquire as to their estimatedmean values and standard deviations.Table I summarizes this information.
In the previous sectionwe commented that optimaluse of government
expenditure policy seems to apply thepurchases componentas a flexible instru-
ment while compensation followsa secular schedule. TableIreinforces this observation. The standard deviationof purchases under thediscretionary policy is anywhere from 50percent to 100 percent greater thanthat of compensation This result on the relativevariation of the twoexpenditure tools accords with
our intuitive observation that it iseasier and more satislctoryto alter a purchasing pattern for goods than to hireand fire public employees.
Not only does thenominal Treasury billrate remain reasonably steady (the result of the previoussection), the chosen billrate is also not subject to sub- stantial uncertainty. Thebill rate is simplynot an especially active instrumentin either the shortor intermediate runs for themodel and loss functionwe are con- sidering. The summarystatistics for the federalpersonal tax scaling factor shown in Table I demonstratethat the plannedvariation in an instrumentcan be exceeded by its unplannedvariation inresponse to realized economicactivity. The standard deviation of the scalingfactor in everyquarter but the last exceedsthe difference between theexpected value of the factorand the no loss valueof unity. The personal tax scaling factoremerges as a policy instrumentmore relevant for short- run stabilization than formeeting intermediaterungoals. This accords with the observations of Politiciansas well as economiststhat proportional alterationof tax schedules isone of the least costlymethods of implementinga discretionary policy. Furtherexperimentation mightinclude reducing thepenalty attached to variations in the scalingfactor in equation(13) to investigatethe effects of allowing a more flexible taxpolicy than thatpermitted in thepresent study. In particular, it would be ofinterest to determinewhether a flexibletax policy could replacea substantial part of thestabilization activitycurrently supported byvariation in governrneexpenditures.
228One further observation which can be drawn from Table I is the evidence of
bias in the discretionary policy. Were the model linear and the loss function
quadratic the expected value of state under both the discretionary and non-
discretionary policies would equal the corresponding nominal state, and the
expected value of policy under the discretionary strategy would equal the nominal
policy. The statistical evidence indicates that, for government purchases especially,
these equalities fail a significant number of times, and suggests a modification to
what we have called the program plan in the discretionary case. Let u be the
expected choice of policy in periodand let x be the expected state. Since
= Là1 + G1(x1 -- ) by definition it follows that u = ü, + G,(x_ , - .,)
and hence that:
(14) ii, = u4- G(.x,--
Since it is important to anticipate as much as possible future policy choices,
simulation of the model can generate unbiased estimates of the expected choices
and expected states of economic activity. The estimated expected policy sequence
would replace the nominal sequence as the orogram plan for administrators.
As economic activity unfolds through time, applied policies would be altered
away from the expected policy in response torealizations of state away from the
expected state, according to equation (14). The numerical values of the applied
policies would he the same under this feedback function as under that of equation
(ii). and the economy will still evolve according to equation (12). The only
difference is that the planned policies would he unbiased estimates of the policies
to be applied.
5. Coruisiot's
The results of this paper indicate that the recommendation of a non-dis-
cretionary macroeconomic policy may in some cases increase the expected value
of a loss function on economic performance by as much as 100 percent. While
the structure ofany particular function might not command widespread acceptance,
our results concur closely with the independentlyderived results of Chow(1972b).
There also appear to be substantial gains available from a discretionary policy
in reduction of uncertainty about future levels of private production and unemploy-
ment. Less satisfactory implications for stabilization of the price level were
obtained.
This study also pointed out the contribution of a discretionary policy
towards stabilizing investment in plant and equipment and the relatively smaller
reduction of uncertainty in expenditures on consumer durables. The least satis-
factory, but none the less enlightening, result was the demonstration that, without
special attention, the residential housing industry may be vulnerable to short-run
stabilization policies.
Continued research by economists will certainly investigate the effects of
relaxing some of the assumptions of the present study, especially that the behavioral
parameters of the model are non-random and equal to their estimated values.
(Tsc (1974), Chow (1974) and Abel (1974) have already started in this direction in
economic contexts.) This study has shown that substantial benefits may accrue
to discretionary amendment of policy choices when the economy has been
229adequately modeled. There is. of course, considerable debate on thestructure
as well as on the parameter values of an adequate model. ihe pO1Ic programand
feedback functions developed for this study displayed desirable featureswhen
applied to the model of the study, they may not appear so desirable whenaPplied
to an alternative model. Thus, for economists, describing how policychoices
affect economic activity is still a fundamental problem.
Even were the question of the model resolved, however, thequestion (to
what extent macroeconomic policy instruments, especiallyexpenditure jtenis
are susceptible to short-run amendment would remain. Lewis (1962) hasaddressed
this question in an ex-post framework and Friedlaender (1968)has considered
someofthe institutional reasons for suspecting that such instrumentsare not all
that flexible. Pierce (1974) has pointed out that the FederalReserve System, alone
among the institutions of government, has an ongoing policy reviewand revision
program. Federal tax policy, potentially the easiest instrumentto change on
short notice, is not now suitable for economicstabilization. Congress hascon-
sistently rejected Presidential requests for stand-byauthority to imposepro-
portional changes in liability schedules. Economists'night approach thisquestion
of instrument flexibility from two directions. First,within the current institutional
framework they can develop modelsofthe degree of flexibilityas a function of
time. While government expenditure policynext quarter is likely highly inflexible.
expenditure policy six quarters ahead ismuch less so. This wouldlead to a generalization of the usualexogenous/predeterminedichotomy toa more Continuous scale of controllability forpolicy instruments. This issueas it relates to control of monetaryaggregates has received attention ina conference of the Federal Reserve BankofBoston (1972) and Pindyckand Roberts (1974). Second,
economists can investigate the degradationin economic performanceoccasioned by instrument inflexibility.For example, how much is lostby restricting discretion to only monetary instruments,and how much could be gainedby opening tax policy to short-run discretionaryamendment?
Neit' }ork Unit'ersitv
APPENI)IX ALPHABElICAL LIST OF Smiitoi.s
Curr currency in the hands of thepublic, NSA
DD demand deposits held bythe public, NSA
Ed household expenditureson durable goods. 1958 prices Ef farm employment
Eg' government employment
En household expenditureson non-durable goods. 1958prices Enf private non-farmemployment
Es household expenditureon services, 1958 prices
total employment
FHL* Federal Home Loanadvances to savings andloan associations Fi imports 1958 prices
Fx exports, 1958 prices
government purchasesofprivately producedgoods and services. 1958 prices
Gp government transferpavnients to persons
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115 housing starts. NSA
hi investment in residential structures. 1958 prices
Ip investment in plant and equipment. 1958 prices
Jr investment in inventories, 1958 prices
Kd stock of consumer durabies
K/i stock of residential housing
Kp stock of plant and equipment
Kr stock of inventories
Le labor force employed
U females participating in the labor force
Lml 3 males 16-24 and over 55 participating in the labor force
Lm2 males 25-54 participating in the labor force
Lt total labor force
Lu labor force unemployed
M manhours paid for
M money supply, NSA, (= Ciirr + DI))
Other other items in the income account
P implicit price deflator for gross private product
Reb Aa corporate bond rate
Rp rate of inflation
R proxy for the expected rate of inflation
Rth** 90 day treasury bill rate
Ru unemployment rate, (= 100 Lu/(Lm 13 + Lm2 + LT))
federal pci sonai tax sealing factor
A Sat' change in savings deposits. NSA
Tc contributions for social insurance
A Thr change in thrift deposits. NSA
Tihf federal indirect business tax and non-tax liabilities
Tibs state and local indirect business tax and non-tax liabilities
Tpf federal personal tax and non-tax payments
Tps state and local personal tax and non-tax payments
u residual of a stochastic equation displaying serial correlation
X gross private product, 1958 prices




Yg* government compensation of its employees
NSA: not seasonally adjusted
* policy instrument
** either Ribor M1 may be taken as an instrument of monetary policy
APPENDIX: EQUATtONS UI THE MODEL
Al.Consumer Services
Es = 0.011I5Pt + 0.02519 Yd/P-4- 0.945Es1 Pt/Pt1+ 0.001 Pt
s.c. = 4.270.
231Consumer Non-durables
En0.19 142 Pt + 0.05258 Yd/P + 0.58957 En_ pt/Pr_1
+ 0.16750Es.1 Pt/Pt_1 + 0.001 FtC
s.e. = 9.476.
Consumer Durables
Ed = -0.30825 (Pt - 7dPL1) -- 0.001683fPt(Rcb + Rp)
- ','d Pt(Rcb+ ô - Rp -)] + 0.30476 (Yd/P - yd Yd 11p
+ 0.90307 Ed_1 Pt/Pt_1 + 0.004 Pt C
se. = 3.130.
Investment in Plant and Equipment
Ip = -34.28(1.0 - p) + 0.34324 (X - yp X) + 0.91648 Ip
- 1.07712{(M* - M.) - yp(M- Al - 2fl
- 1.8801 {(Rcb - R)1 - yp(Rcb - R,)_2] -i- 4C
s.e. = 0.2378M* = 22.405 + 0.76007 X exp (-0.02174 time).
AS.Investment in Business Inventories
Iv-65.408 + 0.39895FS_1 - 0.82856Kr- 0.39516AFS
+ 0.79286 1v1 + 0.39442 u_1 +
s.e.=2.734FS=En-I-Ed+ Fx- FI+G.
Investment in Residential Structures
Ih = 16.568 HSexp(-0.01675 time) + 16.033 HS_1 exp(-0.01675 time)
+ 7.097 DI exp (-0.0 1675 time) -- 6.805 DIll exp (-0.01675 time)
+ 0.01651 Kh.1- C
s.c. = 0.467.
Imports
Fi = -3.929 + O.02025X + 0.79715 Fl..1+ O.41130u_1 +
s.c. = 0.682.
Exports





Y = P X + Yg.
Al 1.Gross Corporate Earnings
Ycor = 0704 + 0.01 I38PX + 0.91509 Yeor_1 + 0.38142PAX+
s.c. = 1.174.
Al2.Dividends
Ydu = 0.03300 Year + 0.82634 Ydv_1 + (
s.c. = 0.355.
A. 13.Federal Indirect Business Taxes
Tibf = Dibfa[16.096- 0.38548 time + 0.06287 P(Es + En+ Ed)]
+ Dibfb{5.07f, + 0.02364P(Es ± En .Edfl+ O.62210u_1+
s.e. = 0.234.
State and Local Indirect Business Taxes
Tibs = (-0.02636 + 0.002O4time)P(Es + En + Ed)+ 0.87825u_1 +
s.e.0.266.
Federal Personal Taxes
Tpf = Pt (Dpfa so. 14656 [(Ygr/Pt)- 0.767] +DpfbS [0.097 74
+ O.00766(Ygr/Pt)](Ygr/Pt) - 0.767) -I- 0.77301 u_i +]
s.e. = 0.00460Ygr = Yd + Tpf ± 7- Gp.
State and Local Personal Taxes
Tps = Pt(0.3321 - 0.00515 time - (0.14267- 0.00255 time)(Yr/Pi)
+ 0.89438 u_1 --
s.e.=0.00118Ygr=Yd+Tpf+Tps+Tc_Gp.
Al?.Contributions for Social Insurance
Tc = Dca [0.78284 - 0.08687 (Ygr/Pt)] Rs Ygr + 0.49656Dcb RsYgr
- (0.68703 - 0.02163 time) Ru Ygr + 0.83111 u_I +
s.c. = 0.199Ygr = Yd ± Tpf + Tps + Tc - Gp.
A18.Government Transfer Payments
Gp = (-2.6059 + 0.06011 time) B Page- (8.8679 -
- 0.13620 time) Drned Page + 0.02831 time Lu + 0.47606 u_1 +
se. = 0.744.
233A19.Other Items in the IncomeAccount
Other8.805 -0.14035 time +080711Other+
s.e. = 1.175.
A0.Disposable Income
Id -' Y - Ycor + Ydi - 'I'thf - Tibs -Tp/ -- Tps - ic + (ip -- Other
Private Non-farm Manhours Paid for




E,f = 0.29162 M exp (0.00339 time) +0.27045 Eii/
+ 0.79596u_, + C
s.e. = 0.120.
Farm Employment
Ef = 4.740 - 0.05601 time + 0.73875 ElI + C
s.e. = 0.172.
Total Employment
= Enf + Ef + Eg.
Labor Force Employed
Le = (0.68004 + 0.27134 Lu_ /Lt-) Et + 0.27250 Le
+ 0.73997 u1 i-
s.c. = 0.179.
Prime Age Males Participating in the Labor Force
Lm2 = Pm2 (0.82601 - 0.00037 time - 0.06267 (EtPt)_1
+ 0.19985 (Lni2/Pni2).1 + C)
s.c. = 0.00154.
Other Males Participating in the Labor Force
Lnil3 = Pin 13 (0.19867- 0.00201 time ± 0.29002 (Et/I't)
+ 0.61997(Ln113/Pinl3)1 + C)
se. = 0.00372.
234
aFemales Participating in the Labor Force
U = Pf1-0.02068 + 0.00105 time + 0.07356(Ei/pt
+ 0.76931(LJ,/Pf)1 + C]
s.e. = 0.00308.
Total Labor Force
Lt = L,n2 + L,n13 + Lf.
Unemployed Labor Force
Lu = Li - Le.
A31,Corporate Bond Rate
Rch = 0.062 -i- 0.25965 Rib- 0.20874Rrh_1 + 006763R;
+ 0.93237 Rch+ C
se. = 0.100.
Demand for Demand Deposits
DD = (Rth)o.0243o(Yd)°°7947(P DD 1/P)°92053exp (-0.06313
- 0.03400 $9 - 000514.V'U + 0.00348 $911 + 0.22363, + C)
s.c. = 0.00692.
Demand for Currency
Curr = (Rcb)°°3098(Yd)°'°427(P Curr_ 1/P_ i)089573 exp(-0.21330
- 0.02944$°1 + 0.00621 .9'II + 0.003599'lIJ + O.23274u_1
+ C)
s.c. = 0.00418.
Change in Savings Deposits
ASau = - 1.268 .9'! ± 1.673.9'i! + [0.06145 -I- 0.08112 s/I
- 0.05235 sill -- 0.03394 f/Ill + 0.01557 Reb (Rch - Rih)J[Yd
- P(Es + En + Ed)] + 0.84227 u.+ C
s.c. = 0.852.
Change in Thrift Deposits




HS = 1.10944 + 0.03477 AThr/LP exp (--0.01675 time)]
+ 0.06817 (FHL - FHL 1)/{P exp (- 0.01675 time)]
- 0.1717 9i + 0.2125 .91I +0.1875 SPIlL + 0.67439 u_1 +
s.e. = 0.0847.
Proxy for the Expected Rate of Inflation
Rp=0.1Rp_1 +0.9Rp'1.
Rate of Inflation
Rp = Rp" + 0.43080 - 0.03912(X_ - X.) + 0.03329(Rp - Rp1 +
s.c. = 1.231 .X= 1.31567 (M- 22.405) exp (0.02175 time)
= 2.5O3Enf.exp(-0.00339 time)
EnJi1=l.0llLt-Ef1-Eg.
Implicit Deflator for Gross Private Product
P = P(l.0 + Rp/10O)°2.
Stock of Consumer Durables
Kd = 0.25 Ed + yd Kd..
Stock of Producers Plant and Equipment
Kp = O.25Ip + ypKp_1.
Stock of Residential Structures
Kh = 0.251h + yhKh.1.
Stock of Business Inventories
Ky = 0.25 Iv + Ku_1.
APPENDIX: PARAMETERS OF THE MODEL
Time-invariant Parameters (other than estimated behavioralparameters)
yd unity minus the quarterly rate of depreciationof consumer durable
goods(= 0.93129)
yh unity minus the quarterly rate of depreciationof residential structures
(= 0.99317)
yp unity minus the quarterly rate of depreciationof plant and equipment
(= 0.97180)
o compounded annual rate of depreciation ofconsumer durable goods
(= 24.78 %)
236Time-varying Parameters
B compounded benefit index for OASDHI benefits, l954/IV = 1.0
DI seasonal dummy for the first quarter of every year,DII. Dilland
DIV similarly
Pagepopulation age 65 and over, millions
Pf female population age 16 and over, millions
Pnil3male population age 16-24 and 55 and over, millions
Pni2male population age 25-54, millions
Pt total population over age 16 (= PrnI3 + Pm2 * Pf), millions
Rscontribution rate for OASDHI program, fraction
Rucontribution rate for Federal Unemployment Insurance, fraction
.9'!independent seasonal dummy forfirstquarter of every year,
(= DI - DIV),.9II and 9'!!! similarly defined
timeclock time index (= 47.00 in 1947/I, = 47.25 in 1947/I!, etc.)
Schedule Shift Parai'ieters(a special class of time-varying parameter)




Dcb 1.0 - Dca




Dpfb 1.0 - Dihfa
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